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The aim of this short article is to build a model in order to take into account 
capital scrapping (or bankruptcies) in an income distribution and growth model. The 
reason to introduce capital scrapping results from the intuition of some 
inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and empirical facts: the rate of 
capacity utilisation data often exhibit a greater stability than it is expected after 
reading theoretical models. We think that capital scrapping might contribute to 
stabilise the utilisation rate. The idea is as follows: an increase of the profit share 
implies a decrease of the rate of capacity utilisation which then involves a rise in 
capital scrapping (or in the rate of bankruptcies). 
We briefly present some empirical facts in the first section. Section 2 is devoted 
to the theoretical predictions in income distribution and growth theories. We survey 
the existing ways to specify capital depreciation and/or capital scrapping in section 3. 
Our model is presented in section 4. Then, we conclude. 
1. Empirical facts 
In many countries, the rate of capital utilisation is subject to cyclical variations, 
related to business cycles, around a stable level. In this section, we focus on French 
economy. 
Between 1965 and 2006, the average rate of capital utilisation is equal to 
83.9%.3 Moreover, the convergence towards this “equilibrium level” is usually pretty 
fast: after the dramatically 1975 downturn (u = 78.7%), the French utilisation rate 
goes back to 83.5% from 1976; similarly, u drops to 79.8% in 1993 but reaches 
82.0% in 1994 and 83.8% in 1995. The French example is particularly illustrative, but 
other countries display the same kind of profiles (Germany, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, etc).4 
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Moreover, from a Post Keynesian standpoint, the relative stability of the 
utilisation rates is all the more surprising since the most of European countries 
(France especially) have experienced large variations of income distribution for forty 
years. For example, the French profit share lost 6 points in the 1970s, then it 
increased of almost 8 points during the 1980s and stabilised  thereafter Compared to 
these large fluctuations, utilisation rate variations seems quite moderate in the 
medium run: 
Capacity utilisation rate and profit share (%), 5 years 
moving average, France, 1965-2005
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2. The rate of capacity utilisation in income distribution and growth 
theories 
The rate of capacity utilisation (u) plays a crucial role in most of the Post 
Keynesian growth theories for many reasons: it is the core of the accelerator effect in 
firms accumulation decisions; as a component of the profit rate, it contributes both to 
the profitability effects and to the capitalists saving decision; in addition, firms may 
adjust their investments to reach a normal rate of capacity utilisation (un). It is useful 
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to make a distinction between three kinds of models: Kaleckian models, the Bhaduri 
& Marglin [1990] specification, and the Kaldorian/Robinsonian models.5 
In their standard specification (closed economy, no workers saving), Kaleckian 
models are stagnationist, cooperative and wage-led at once. It means that an 
increase of the profit share (that we note η afterwards) results in a decrease of the 
capacity utilisation rate (u), the profit rate (r = η.u/ν, where ν stands for a constant 
capital coefficient) and the accumulation rate (g = I/K where I and K represent 
investment and capital stock respectively). Hence, an exogenous shock on η implies 
a shock on u in the opposite way. Moreover, in order to be cooperative, the u 
variation must outweigh (in percentage) the η variation (i.e. (du/u)/(dη/η) < –1). It is 
worth noting that it rarely happens (for example, only 10 % of the French quarterly 
data exhibit the ‘good’ elasticity between 1979 and 2006). Lavoie [1996] and Lavoie, 
Rodriguez & Seccareccia [2004] introduce a hysteretic mechanism in order to explain 
the long-run convergence of u towards un. But this mechanism is of little interest for 
our purpose for two reasons: firstly, it is a long-run mechanism; secondly, 
convergence occurs because firms adjust their normal rate through time (while the 
long-run rate seems to be constant). 
Bhaduri & Marglin [1990] opened a new strand of models by introducing a slight 
difference in their specification. Assuming that the accumulation rate depends on u 
and η (instead of u and r), they show that the consequences of a shock on the profit 
share remain indeterminate: u and η may evolve either in opposite or in the same 
ways (stagnationist or exhilarationist regime) depending on the parameters’ value of 
the model. Moreover, parameters’ value is a matter of facts rather than of theoretical 
assumptions. It is then possible to combine large variations of η with small impact on 
u. But, accepting this solution consists in admitting that income distribution has a 
weak impact on activity and growth. We are reluctant to accept this conclusion. This 
is why we try to enrich the model in order to conciliate the stability of the rate of 
utilisation with some significant effect of distribution on accumulation. 
At last, the Kaldorian/Robinsonian models rest on the assumption that u = un in 
the long-run (Kaldor [1957], Robinson [1962]). This assumption seems to fit correctly 
the data, but it leaves us unsatisfied for two reasons: firstly, this equality is postulated 
(rather than proved); secondly the adjustments take place through the profit share 
variations, which is then endogenous. If this latter assumption is rejected, it is 
necessary to admit that u may differ from un (at least in the short or medium-run), and 
some mechanisms must be defined in order to restore the equality. Models must then 
get round to Harrodian instability (i.e. when firms react to u < un by cutting their 
investments, the decrease of u worsen). Some solutions have been proposed to this 
problem6 but they are not in the scope of this article because they are based on long-
run mechanisms while u seems to be stable even in the short-run. 
To sum up this brief survey, theoretical predictions appear to be inconsistent 
with empirical data because either they assume that the utilisation rate is 
endogenous and exhibits wide variations or the convergence of u towards un is a 
long-run mechanism. Furthermore, if theoretical predictions are consistent with data, 
income distribution could have no impact on activity and growth. In the rest of the 
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paper, we try to depart from these conclusions by taking capital scrapping and firms 
bankruptcies into account.7 
3. Capital depreciation and capital scrapping 
If accumulation depends on investment, it also depends on capital depreciation 
(δ), that is: 
Kt+1 = (1 – δ)Kt + It 
In Post Keynesian income distribution and growth models, capital depreciation 
is usually introduced as an exogenous parameter. Nevertheless, there are two 
notable exceptions. On the one hand, Kurz [1991] and Bruno [1999] assume that δ is 
positively related to u because of physical wear and tear: machines quickly damage 
when their use is intensive. 
On the other hand, Steindl [1979] and Cassetti [2006] assume that δ is 
negatively related to u. The reason is that the expected life-time of capital is 
supposed to be finite and equipments are scrapped when they arrive at the end of 
their life.8 But the expected life-time might be adjusted to business cycles: firms may 
delay the capital scrapping when u is high, and they can anticipate it when u is low 
(or some firms bankrupt and their equipments are scrapped). 
This capital scrapping has an interesting property: it contributes to the 
stabilisation of the rate of capital utilisation. In the case an economic slump, capital 
scrapping slacks the decrease of u (while this decrease is intensified if firms react by 
cutting their investments). 
We depart from Steindl’s analysis in two ways. Firstly, Steindl assumes that 
these capital scrapping adjustments are representative of a competitive economy 
whereas, in the contemporary oligopolistic regimes, “firms are more prepared to 
accept low long-term rates of utilisation” (p. 7). However, time series do not display 
the expected long waves which would result from Steindl’s conclusions. On the 
contrary, utilisation rates are subject to cyclical variations around a stable level. This 
leads us to keep the capital scrapping adjustment as a mechanism which could 
stabilise the rate of utilisation still now. 
Secondly, neither Steindl nor Cassetti give a formal proof of the negative 
relation between the rate of utilisation and capital scrapping (which is postulated). 
Our main purpose is to find such a formal proof. 
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4. The model 
We propose a model in order to assess the impact of a change in income 
distribution on both investment and capital scrapping. It is a one period model which 
implies that all the economic decisions occur in the time of the model. The impact of 
a change in income distribution may then be analysed by comparative statics 
calculations. 
4.1. Framework 
It is necessary for our purpose to introduce heterogeneity between firms so as 
to make a distinction between those which will decide to produce and those which will 
not.  
We thus assume that firms differ in regard of their labour productivity, the 
production (qj) of the jth firm being given by: 
j
j
j
a
l
q =  
where lj stands for the level of labour and aj for the reciprocal of labour 
productivity. 
As we focus on proportions (rate of accumulation, rate of bankruptcies, etc.), 
the scale of the economy (number of firms, capital stock, etc.) has no impact on the 
results of the model. So, we suppose that an exogenous number of firms have 
decided to enter the market. When they have taken this decision, firms knew the aj 
distribution law, i.e. aj is uniformly distributed between σ−a  and σ+a  (where a<σ  
is a constant) but they did not know their own aj. As a firm entered the market, it had 
to invest i0 units of (fixed) capital (whatever could happen afterwards). 
In a second step, we suppose that labour productivity level is disclosed to each 
firm. From this information, each firm has two decisions to take: firstly, whether to 
produce or not; secondly, which additive capital it has to accumulate in order to 
produce. We suppose that firms decide to produce, according to their productivity, if 
production allows them to get a minimum profit rate rmin. Firms pulling a very low 
labour productivity stop producing and loose their capital investment i0, which is 
scrapped. We say that these firms bankrupt. 
The goods market is considered to be monopolistically competitive. The 
demand to the jth firm is specified as: 
η
1
−






=
p
p
kq jjj  
where η stands for the exogenous demand elasticity, p (pj) for the endogenous 
market’s (firm’s) price of consumption goods and kj the quantity of capital the firm j 
finally decide to accumulate.  
We assume that, to remain competitive and keep costumers, all the firms are 
actually compelled to set their own price as the leading firm, i.e. the firm getting the 
lower unit labour cost, i.e. the higher productivity level 1/(a–σ). The leader maximises 
their profits by applying a mark-up (depending on η) on its unit labour cost, that is: 
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( )wap σ
η
−
−
=
1
1
 
Note that η (< 1) represents the mark-up or the profit share (in variable costs) of 
the leading firm. This parameter is actually the degree of monopoly on the goods 
market (the lower η, the more competitive is the goods markets). For other firms, 
profit share is given by: 
( )
σ
ηη
−
−−=
a
a j
j 11  
Without loss of generality, we set σ so as to have ηj = 0 for the less productive 
firm ( σ+= aa j ). So, we get:  
η
η
σ
−
=
2
a
 
Finally, every producing firm sets its price to p, whatever its own aj. So, the 
profit condition to produce can be written as: 
( ) min
min
min
11 r
u
a
a
r
u
rr
jj
jj
j
≥





−
−−⇒
≥⇒
≥
νσ
η
ν
η
 
We add two hypotheses: 
- We suppose that the capital coefficient ν is equal to one. 
- More fundamentally, we suppose that all producing firms have the same rate 
of capacity utilization. In our model, the accumulation rate by firms is related 
to their profitability (which is itself related to different aj), so that the 
denominator of u will differ from one firm to another : very productive firms 
will fuel the goods markets more than less productive firms thanks to a higher 
capital accumulation. Nevertheless, we suppose that, given this height effect, 
the global demand is uniformly spread over producing firms : uj = u (for every 
producing firm; non producing firm have a utilisation rate equal to zero). 
Finally, the profit condition gives the value of aj which splits producing firms 
from failing ones (remember that labour productivity is decreasing with 
parameter aj). 
( )( )uara ση −−≤ 1
11
min
*
 
We call η* the profit share of the “last” producing firm, i.e. firm with a labour 
productivity of 1/a* : firms which have a profit share inferior to η* will bankrupt, 
whereas firms with higher profit share will product. At the equilibrium, we thus have: 
 
*
min*
u
r
=η  (1) 
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This “production condition” equation establishes a negative relation between η* 
and u*. Finally, it is very easy to show that η*/η is the bankruptcy rate of this 
economy. 
4.2. Investment behaviour 
In this model, we have assumed that every firm on the market has “already” 
invested the initial “entry” capital i0. 
Firms which are not profitable enough stop investing, so that their accumulation 
(which is given by i = i0) involves a revenue effect but has no impact on aggregate 
capital stock. 
We suppose that each producing firm accumulates additional capital. To 
estimate this additional capital accumulation behaviour, we take the i0 as the “initial” 
capital stock of these firms: kj = i0. We then suppose a very standard accumulation 
behaviour (the only original point is that this is actually a microeconomic behaviour 
equation): 
uiri
k
k
ujr
j
j +=
∆
 
4.3. Saving behaviour 
Only firms which produce make profits. We suppose that capitalists who earn 
these firms want to save a portion sp of these profits. The saving behaviour can be 
written:  
jp
j
j
rs
k
s
=  
4.4. Macroeconomic investment 
If we suppose that the initial investment i0 is the denominator in the capital 
accumulation function, we can write the total investment function as:  
 uiri
k
ki
k
i
ujr
j
j
j
j ++=
∆+
= 10  for producing firms, 
 10 ==
jj
j
k
i
k
i
 for non-producing firms. 
So the macroeconomic investment function is given by: 





 ∆
+= ∫∫
−
+
−
*
0
2
1 a
a
j
a
a
j dak
kda
k
i
K
I
σ
σ
σσ
 
which can be written as: 
( ) uii
K
I
ur 





++





−+= *
*
2
111 ηη
η
η
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4.5. Macroeconomic saving 
Similarly, we can calculate the macroeconomic saving function:  
∫
−+−
=
* )(1
*
a
a
j
jp da
k
uas
aaK
S
σ
pi
σ
 
which can be simplified as: 
( )us
K
S
p
*
2
1 ηη +=  
4.6. Macroeconomic equilibrium 
The macroeconomic goods market equilibrium 
K
S
K
I
=  allows eventually to 
determine u, the capacity utilisation for producing firms: 
 ( )( ) 





−−+






−
=
urp iis
u
*
*
*
2
1
1
1
1
ηη
η
η
 (2) 
This equation corresponds to the IS curve of our model. At this stage, we must 
combine equations (1) and (2). We thus eventually get a system of two equations: 
( )
( )



=
=
**
**
,
),(
ηη
ηηη
gu
uf
 
From this system, we can get an increasing relation between the profit share η 
and the bankruptcy rate η*/η, i.e. the proportion of failing firms increases as η 
increases.9 This pretty counterintuitive result can be explained easily: as the 
economy is stagnationist, an increase of η involves a more than proportional 
decrease in u. Finally the average profit rate of the economy decreases and a greater 
proportion of firms do not fulfil the minimum profit rate condition anymore. 
5. Conclusion 
The main conclusion of our model is that the macroeconomic accumulation rate 
decreases with profit share, but this accumulation slowdown goes with some kind of 
production concentration on the goods market: as the bankruptcy rate increases, 
production is shared between less (remaining) firms. 
To understand this conclusion, it is worth noting that, in our model, if all firms 
had the same profit share η (and thus if there is no bankrupt: η* = 0), the IS curve 
(equation (2)) would give the same rate of capacity utilisation (u*) as in the standard 
Kaleckian model. Our crucial result is that u* is now the product of two distinct terms 
which vary in opposite directions as η increases: on the one hand, the “standard 
Kaleckian u*” (second term) encompasses the stagnationist nature of the economy 
(i.e. a negative relation between u* and η); on the other hand, the first term indicates 
that the utilisation rate of producing firms is an increasing function of the bankruptcy 
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rate η*/η. This second effect thus lessens –without offsetting– the negative effect of 
the profit share on the utilisation rate. We think that it contributes to explain the 
utilisation rate stability in data.  
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